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Abstract
This paper is the first empirical research on the determinants of the capital structure of Japanese 
banks, using Japanese banks’ financial data for two decades from 2000 to 2017 and adding new 
evidence to previous literature on the banks’ capital structure. Previous researches show that the 
determinants of capital structure are different among countries or continents. We show that 
determinants vary and change in accordance with differences in business models among banks even 
within one country. By focusing on different business models between four sub-samples, 
“International banks before the Global Financial Crisis,” “Domestic banks before the GFC,” 
“International banks after the GFC,” and “Domestic banks after the GFC”, we analyze whether the 
determinants of capital structure differ among these sub-samples. The results are totally different 
and we find no determinants which can significantly and commonly explain all four sub-samples.
Keywords: Japanese banks, Capital Structure
JEL classification: G21, G28
1.  Introduction
Banks’ capital ratio is generally kept much lower than that of non-financial companies. This is 
puzzling for economists from a positive-theory viewpoint (DeAngelo and Stulz [2015]). Monetary 
and financial economists have examined the determinants of banks’ capital structure for decades, 
and this became a hotter research field after the Global Financial Crisis that caused financial 
regulatory reforms.  
There are two approaches that explain the determinants of banks’ capital structure. The first 
approach is a corporate financial approach, which tries to explain banks’ capital structure based on 
the theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and its development in corporate finance, such as tax 
savings on the financing of debt, a pecking order hypothesis, and so on. 
The second approach is a banking approach, which places more focus on a bank’s unique 
business model compared to non-financial companies and regards this uniqueness as a factor causing 
the bank’s unique balance sheet structure: its low capital ratio (Diamond and Dybvig [1983], 
Diamond and Rajan [2000], Allen et al. [2011], DeAngelo and Stulz [2015]). DeAngelo and Stulz 
1  Faculty of Economics, Saitama University, Email: taku.kinai@murc.jp
2  Faculty of Economics, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Saitama University, Email: takeshiosada@
mail.saitama-u.ac.jp
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(2015), the latest theoretical research using this approach, shows that a bank’s low capital ratio is 
optimal for banks whose central function is liquidity production. Banks provide deposits to the 
economy, and these are its most liquid assets. Deposits can bear a negative liquidity premium placed 
on it by the depositor, which enables the banks to earn external funds with lower costs than other 
external funds. This lower cost can explain the higher deposit-to-asset ratio, or the lower capital 
ratio.
Previous empirical works have tried to tackle this puzzle by using explanatory variables which 
are based on both banking and corporate-finance approaches. However, they can explain only some 
of the determinants of banks’ capital structure. Gropp and Heider (2010), examining the capital 
structure of large U.S. and European banks from 1991 to 2004, found that an individual bank’s 
specific factors are ultimately the most important determinant of a bank’s capital structure. Kinai 
(2018), in subsequent research by Gropp and Heider (2010), examined the capital structure of U.S. 
and European banks by adding new explanatory variables that are based on both approaches. 
Although these new variables have significant effects, this research also concluded that a firm’s 
capital structure is mostly driven by unobserved individual firm-specific factors.
What is the source of an individual bank’s specific factors? Kinai (2018), examining the 
difference he found between the estimation results of U.S. and European banks, pointed out the 
possibility that the difference comes from differences in their business models. Although banks are 
categorized into one business type, “the banking industry”, their business models differ from country 
to country as well as within a country. This difference is probably due to their cultural and historical 
backgrounds.
Taking Japan as an example, while we have more than 100 commercial banks in Japan, their 
business models differ. Some do business in international markets and can access several financial 
markets to receive and invest funds, while others only operate in one small, prefecture-level market, 
and deposits from this market are their single, most important source of external funds. Different 
back histories should also affect their different business models and capital structures. Some 
international banks have longer histories as commercial banks and have engaged in nationwide and 
international business for more than 100 years since Japanese modernization. On the other hand, 
some regional banks were originally saving banks or mutual banks and they have operated in a very 
small business area (Hoshi and Kashyap [2004]).
In this research, we categorize Japan’s banks into two groups based on their business models as 
well as their back histories: “the international banks” which do business in international markets and 
have a relatively long history as commercial banks, and “the regional banks (the domestic banks)” 
which have operated only in one small, prefecture-level market since the middle of the 20th century3. 
Then, focusing on the possible difference between the two groups, we examine whether banks with 
different business models differ in what determines their capital structure.
As is clearly shown by Hoshi and Kashyap (2004), Japanese banks’ business models have been 
strongly affected by regulatory changes during their long history since the 19th century. The current 
regulatory reforms since the Global Financial Crisis may have changed their business models as 
well. So, we will split the sample into before-2008 and after-2009 and examine whether the 
determinants of their capital structure changed before and after the GFC.
Using the unbalanced panel financial data of all Japan’s banks from 2000 to 2017, we estimated 
a fixed effects model to examine the effects of possible factors on banks’ capital ratios. By comparing 
the results between four sub-samples – “International banks before the Global Financial Crisis,” 
3  Most of the current regional banks were born under a “one prefecture, one bank” government program in the 1940s (Hoshi 
and Kashyap [2004] p.58).
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“Domestic banks before the GFC,” “International banks after the GFC,” and “Domestic banks after 
the GFC” – we show that the determinants differ among banks and eras even within one country. We 
find no determinants that can significantly and commonly explain all four sub-samples. 
Previous researches, such as Gropp and Heider (2010) and Kinai (2018), show that the 
determinants of capital structure differ among countries, and point out that these differences are 
probably caused by differences in business models due to the differences in their cultural and 
historical backgrounds. This paper contributes to this literature by showing differences among banks 
even within “one” country that are also due to their different business models.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which examines the determinants of banks’ 
capital structure by using Japanese financial data. There is a lot of literature that examines the effects 
of capital structure on banks’ behavior in Japan (such as Montgomery [2005], Osada, Onji and Vera 
[2017]). Our research will also contribute to future work that examines the interaction between 
banks’ capital structure and other economic variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the models and econometric estimation 
as well as explaining the definition of variables in our model. In section 3, we present the estimation 
results and analyze them. Section 4 concludes.
2.  Models and econometric estimation
In this paper, we employ following the seven independent variables affecting banks capital structure 
using annual data in an unbalanced panel: P Loan Ratio, M Loan Ratio, Depo Ratio, Loan Rate, 
Depo Rate, Cost Ratio, and ln(Asset). 
P Loan Ratio and M Loan Ratio are the ratio of Retail Loans to Total Assets and the ratio of 
Loans to SMEs to Total Assets, respectively. We use these two independent variables as the degree 
of asymmetric information between banks and borrowers as well as the degree of liquidity of their 
assets. According to Diamond and Rajan (2000), Retail and SME loans are less liquid assets with 
more asymmetric information between banks and borrowers than loans to big companies. So, banks 
with a higher ratio for these two assets have a stronger incentive to hold capital to cope with liquidity 
shocks and borrowers’ moral hazard. 
Depo Ratio is the ratio of Deposits to Total Assets. We use it to capture the liquidity premium, 
a concept used by DeAngelo and Stults (2015), one of the newer theoretical banking papers. Deposits 
are a source of funding with a negative liquidity premium. Depositors who favor this liquidity will 
accept a negative premium so banks can obtain funds at lower costs, which produces more profit 
resulting higher capital ratio. 
Loan Rate is the ratio of interest income on loans to total loans. There are two conflicting 
hypotheses which explain the relationship between this rate and capital structure. According to 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2015), the higher Loan Rate produces more profit resulting in a higher capital 
ratio. On the other hand, we can hypothesize that worse banks with a lower capital ratio have more 
of an incentive to make loans to riskier borrowers, or borrowers with a higher interest rate, which 
leads to a negative relationship between this rate and the capital ratio.
Depo Rate is the ratio of interest expenditure on deposits to total deposits. A lower Depo Rate 
produces more profits resulting in a higher capital ratio, which leads to a negative relationship. This 
relationship can also be explained by hypothesizing that worse banks with a lower capital ratio have 
to pay a higher Depo Rate to depositors when they raise money. 
Cost Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. We use it as a measure of financial 
intermediary costs, in other words a bank’s efficiency. A lower Cost Ratio produces more profits 
resulting in a higher capital ratio (DeAngelo and Stultz [2015]). 
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When we explain the relationship between a capital ratio and the first six independent variables, 
we often use the banking theory of DeAngelo and Stults (2015), where profitable variables can cause 
a higher capital ratio through the channel of capital accumulation. However, from the corporate 
financial view based on trade-off theory, there can be a negative relationship between profits and 
capital ratios. Companies with higher profits can enjoy higher tax saving benefits from debt financing. 
As a result, they have a stronger incentive to keep a lower capital ratio (Frank and Goyal [2009]). 
The seventh variable is a logarithm of total assets, ln(Asset), which is used to measure size 
effects. According to corporate finance theories, such as a pecking-order hypothesis, bigger 
companies have less incentive to finance through stocks because they dislike the mispricing in the 
stock market caused by asymmetric information with investors (Myers and Majluf [1984]). Also, 
bigger companies are less likely to go bankrupt so they have a stronger incentive to prefer debt-
financing.
Expected estimation signs on coefficients are as follows: P Loan Ratio (+), M Loan Ratio (+), 
Depo Ratio (+), Loan Rate (+/-), Depo Rate (+/-), Cost Ratio (+/-), and ln(Asset) (-). 
As for dependent variables that measure banks’ capital structure, following previous studies 
(Gropp and Heider [2010], Kinai [2018]), we use three different capital ratios: the Ratio of capital to 
assets (Equity Ratio), the Regulatory capital adequacy ratio (Cap Ratio), and the Tier 1 Ratio. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables we use. All the data are for the end of 
each fiscal year and unconsolidated-base data, at the end of each March from 2000 to 2017. Table 2 
shows their correlations, VIF and Tolerance, where there is no multi-collinearity among our 
explanatory variables. Our data source is Nikkei Financial Data (NEEDS-CD ROM database)4. 
Using unbalanced panel data, we estimate a static model with fixed effects as follows5:
Capit = β0 + BXit + ct + ci + uit,
where Capit is a dependent variable into which we put three different capital ratios. Xit signifies 
independent variables based on both banking and corporate-financial views. The regression includes 
time and individual-bank fixed effects (ct,ci) to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
individual-bank level and across time that may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level to account for heteroscedasticity and the serial correlation of 
errors (Peterson [2009]).
Our estimations were conducted using both the full sample and two different sub-samples: one 
is “international banks” which do business in international markets and the other is “regional banks 
(domestic banks)” which operate only in one small, prefecture-level market. We also divide sample 
periods into two sub-sample periods: one is before the Global Financial Crisis, or 2008, and the 
other is after 2009. As explained in the introduction, we focus on the different business models that 
probably affect the determinants of capital structure. Comparing and analyzing the results for each 
sub-sample, we can focus on the significant implications from what we find. 
3.  Results
Estimation results in Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the coefficients of the explanatory variables and their 
corresponding standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual bank level. From the estimation 
4  This database records regulatory capital ratios only since 2000. 
5  We do not use dynamic types of models which are often used in panel date analysis. Also, we do not use the market data 
which were used in a prominent previous study (Gropp and Heider [2010]). These improvements are left for future research.
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Equity 
Ratio
Cap 
Ratio
Tier 1 
Ratio
P Loan 
Ratio
M Loan 
Ratio
Depo 
Ratio
Loan 
Rate
Depo 
Rate
Cost 
Ratio
ln
(Asset) VIF Tolerance
Equity Ratio 1.000
Cap Ratio 0.625 1.000
Tier 1 Ratio 0.748 0.869 1.000
P Loan Ratio -0.259 -0.322 -0.261 1.000 1.68 0.594
M Loan Ratio -0.273 -0.683 -0.528 0.601 1.000 3.68 0.272
Depo Ratio -0.305 -0.562 -0.331 0.385 0.633 1.000 2.74 0.365
Loan Rate -0.297 -0.656 -0.524 0.352 0.717 0.426 1.000 4.11 0.243
Depo Rate -0.006 0.052 -0.106 -0.158 -0.152 -0.522 0.187 1.000 2.12 0.472
Cost Ratio -0.278 -0.642 -0.451 0.253 0.668 0.524 0.734 -0.120 1.000 4.66 0.215
ln(Asset) 0.200 0.599 0.343 -0.294 -0.673 -0.645 -0.604 0.221 -0.819 1.000 3.33 0.300
The sample consists of 130 Japanese banks from FY 1999 to FY 2016. Subsample A consists of 25 
international banks which conduct overseas operations. Sub-sample B consists of 105 domestic banks which 
do not operate overseas.
Table 1.
Table 2.　Correlations, VIF and Tolerance
 
Mean Median St. Dev. Max Min
All banks
Equity Ratio 0.049 0.048 0.014 0.127 0.001
Cap Ratio 0.105 0.101 0.024 0.245 0.005
Tier 1 Ratio 0.083 0.079 0.026 0.196 0.002
P Loan Ratio 0.187 0.178 0.072 0.653 0.007
M Loan Ratio 0.507 0.518 0.128 0.797 0.071
Depo Ratio 0.858 0.893 0.119 0.963 0.132
Loan Rate 0.020 0.020 0.005 0.064 0.001
Depo Rate 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.029 0.000
Cost Ratio 0.012 0.012 0.003 0.028 0.000
ln Asset 14.753 14.697 1.200 19.135 12.320
Sub-sample  A (International banks)
Equity Ratio 0.056 0.057 0.014 0.088 0.017
Cap Ratio 0.130 0.124 0.027 0.219 0.067
Tier 1 Ratio 0.099 0.095 0.031 0.196 0.034
P Loan Ratio 0.153 0.151 0.064 0.339 0.011
M Loan Ratio 0.397 0.413 0.125 0.634 0.071
Depo Ratio 0.720 0.795 0.183 0.924 0.132
Loan Rate 0.017 0.017 0.004 0.027 0.001
Depo Rate 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.029 0.000
Cost Ratio 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.028 0.000
ln Asset 16.360 15.922 1.193 19.135 13.749
Sub-sample  B (Domestic banks)
Equity Ratio 0.048 0.047 0.014 0.127 0.001
Cap Ratio 0.099 0.098 0.020 0.245 0.005
Tier 1 Ratio 0.079 0.077 0.023 0.193 0.002
P Loan Ratio 0.195 0.185 0.072 0.653 0.007
M Loan Ratio 0.529 0.539 0.117 0.797 0.183
Depo Ratio 0.886 0.903 0.075 0.963 0.152
Loan Rate 0.021 0.021 0.005 0.064 0.009
Depo Rate 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.000
Cost Ratio 0.012 0.012 0.003 0.022 0.004
ln Asset 14.430 14.522 0.907 17.297 12.320
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results in Table 3, we can find the effects of each factor on capital structure on average in the full 
sample period. More importantly for our research, by comparing the results of the two sub-sample 
periods, or between Tables 4 and 5, we can find the effects of changes in banks’ business models 
caused by regulatory reforms which happened before and after the Global Financial Crisis in Japan. 
Also, by comparing the results between the International and Domestic Banks in each sample period, 
we can find the effects of the difference in business models on their capital structure. The following 
are the results and analyses of the four sub-samples: “International banks before the Global Financial 
Crisis,” “Domestic banks before the GFC,” “International banks after the GFC,” and “Domestic 
banks after the GFC”.
Starting with the results for the international banks before the GFC in Table 4, they have 
negatively significant results in ln(Asset) and Loan Rate. In support of the corporate-financial 
hypothesis, the bigger international banks tended to hold less capital, and, worse, international banks 
with a lower capital ratio had more incentive to make loans to riskier borrowers, or borrowers with 
higher interest rates, before the GFC. 
However, international banks’ behavior changed after the GFC. The results in Table 5 show that 
Depo Ratio, Depo Rate and Cost Ratio have significant results. The Cost Ratio has especially 
significant positive results on all the three dependent variables at the 1% level. Because these three 
independent variables relate to banks’ costs, we can say that after the GFC, international banks tried 
to heighten their capital ratio by reducing their costs: by increasing deposits with negative liquidity 
premiums (DeAngelo and Stultz [2015]), lowering their deposit interest-rate and reducing their 
operating expenses. As we predicted, international banks’ behavior, or their business models, changed 
after the GFC in terms of their capital structure.
As for the domestic banks, their results are different both from those for the international banks 
and for the two sample periods. Domestic banks before the GFC have significant positive results in P 
Table 3.　Full sample period: from 1999 to 2017
All Banks International Domestic Banks
Eqiuty Ratio Cap Ratio Tier 1 Ratio Eqiuty Ratio Cap Ratio Tier 1 Ratio Eqiuty Ratio Cap Ratio Tier 1 Ratio
P Loan Ratio 0.012 0.019 0.022 -0.007 -0.032 -0.039 0.014 0.050** 0.055**
se (0.012) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.056) (0.068) (0.013) (0.022) (0.026)
M Loan Ratio 0.009 -0.055*** -0.022 0.013 -0.049 -0.045 0.007 -0.073*** -0.039
se (0.011) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) (0.037) (0.013) (0.019) (0.028)
Depo Ratio -0.028* -0.098*** -0.083** -0.004 -0.064** -0.054*** -0.040 -0.078* -0.057
se (0.015) (0.029) (0.032) (0.014) (0.025) (0.019) (0.024) (0.046) (0.063)
Loan Rate -0.551* 0.309 0.270 -0.368 0.581 0.609 -0.441 -0.177 -0.147
se (0.289) (0.457) (0.489) (0.677) (0.737) (0.930) (0.315) (0.456) (0.539)
Depo Rate -0.697* -3.935*** -4.000*** -0.811* -2.491** -3.815*** -0.151 -0.987 -1.370
se (0.420) (0.925) (0.912) (0.442) (0.894) (0.974) (1.390) (1.993) (2.123)
Cost Ratio 0.619 1.054 0.916 0.076 1.001 1.085 0.597 -0.052 -0.204
se (0.404) (0.814) (0.916) (0.477) (1.151) (1.116) (0.543) (0.943) (1.014)
ln(Asset) -0.006* -0.001 -0.002 -0.011* 0.000 -0.009 -0.006 -0.012* -0.007
se (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Constant 0.162*** 0.220** 0.231** 0.256** 0.207 0.339 0.170** 0.363*** 0.263*
se (0.053) (0.093) (0.115) (0.105) (0.165) (0.221) (0.070) (0.113) (0.134)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,829 1,823 1,507 309 305 301 1,520 1,518 1,206
Adjusted R2 0.306 0.439 0.544 0.582 0.742 0.820 0.268 0.387 0.322
Unique Banks 130 130 130 25 25 25 105 105 105
  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level.
  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5 % and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.　Before the Global Financial Crisis: from 1999 to 2008 
All Banks International Domestic Banks
Eqiuty Ratio Cap Ratio Tier 1 Ratio Eqiuty Ratio Cap Ratio Tier 1 Ratio Eqiuty Ratio Cap Ratio Tier 1 Ratio
P Loan Ratio 0.039** 0.090*** 0.074*** 0.046 0.075 0.087 0.035* 0.097*** 0.069**
se (0.019) (0.027) (0.024) (0.050) (0.070) (0.059) (0.021) (0.033) (0.029)
M Loan Ratio 0.000 -0.034* -0.010 0.001 -0.025 -0.017* -0.001 -0.042 -0.011
se (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.024) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029)
Depo Ratio -0.030 -0.053** -0.023 -0.015 -0.055 -0.010 -0.030 -0.041 -0.027
se (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) (0.035) (0.027) (0.044) (0.037) (0.047)
Loan Rate -0.790** -0.889*** -0.996** -0.873 -1.179* -1.213*** -0.581 -0.679 -0.837*
se (0.396) (0.327) (0.390) (0.702) (0.641) (0.420) (0.469) (0.421) (0.498)
Depo Rate -0.478 -0.338 -0.199 -0.258 0.085 0.037 0.289 0.654 0.212
se (0.736) (0.666) (0.831) (0.425) (0.718) (0.608) (1.272) (1.547) (1.829)
Cost Ratio 0.641 -0.358 0.139 -0.323 0.394 -0.400 0.420 -0.978 -0.394
se (0.583) (0.777) (0.780) (0.846) (0.981) (0.920) (0.753) (0.903) (0.997)
ln(Asset) -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.019** -0.010 -0.015* -0.004 -0.007 -0.005
se (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.161** 0.285*** 0.165* 0.387** 0.337*** 0.362** 0.128 0.267** 0.185*
se (0.074) (0.083) (0.084) (0.149) (0.114) (0.139) (0.090) (0.108) (0.106)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 917 916 914 153 153 151 764 763 763
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.343 0.241 0.688 0.548 0.703 0.179 0.324 0.182
Unique Banks 129 129 129 25 25 25 104 104 104
  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level.
  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5 % and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 5.　After the Global Financial Crisis: from 2009 to 2017
All Banks International Domestic Banks
Eqiuty Ratio Cap Ratio Tier 1 Ratio Eqiuty Ratio Cap Ratio Tier 1 Ratio Eqiuty Ratio Cap Ratio Tier 1 Ratio
P Loan Ratio -0.003 0.016 0.009 -0.019 0.019 -0.034 0.011 0.048 0.035
se (0.022) (0.040) (0.042) (0.030) (0.107) (0.086) (0.018) (0.033) (0.028)
M Loan Ratio -0.001 -0.082** -0.034 0.015 -0.090 -0.085 -0.010 -0.103*** -0.053*
se (0.014) (0.034) (0.044) (0.029) (0.098) (0.090) (0.015) (0.029) (0.028)
Depo Ratio -0.001 -0.040 -0.032 0.043*** 0.031 0.055* -0.017 0.015 0.005
se (0.008) (0.031) (0.027) (0.007) (0.034) (0.032) (0.015) (0.032) (0.047)
Loan Rate 0.789** 1.146 -0.135 -0.138 1.639 -0.260 0.945*** 0.453 -1.230
se (0.365) (0.749) (1.360) (0.627) (2.526) (2.731) (0.351) (0.681) (1.050)
Depo Rate -0.656 -2.719 -3.623* -1.056* -1.192 -3.608* 1.035 0.942 3.034
se (1.478) (2.841) (1.939) (0.531) (1.926) (2.077) (2.796) (5.094) (3.540)
Cost Ratio -0.171 0.366 -1.453 -4.087*** -9.784*** -10.351*** 0.659 1.362 2.400
se (0.604) (1.181) (1.773) (0.703) (3.006) (2.237) (0.526) (1.106) (1.497)
ln(Asset) -0.015** -0.005 -0.028** -0.019*** -0.008 -0.017 -0.013* -0.007 -0.005
se (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.016)
Constant 0.279*** 0.233 0.615*** 0.381*** 0.350 0.493* 0.244** 0.211 0.167
se (0.093) (0.146) (0.171) (0.074) (0.261) (0.265) (0.115) (0.153) (0.261)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Number of Observations 802 797 483 138 134 132 664 663 351
Adjusted R2 0.411 0.170 0.429 0.624 0.419 0.629 0.420 0.292 0.250
Unique Banks 117 117 115 19 19 19 98 98 96
  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level.
  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5 % and 10% levels, respectively.
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Loan Ratio on all the three dependent variables in Table 4. Domestic banks which increased their 
retail loans during this period have a stronger incentive to hold capital to cope with liquidity shocks 
and borrowers’ moral hazard.
Like international banks, the determinants of domestic banks also changed after the GFC, After 
the GFC, they have had significant “negative” results in M Loan Ratio and positive results in Loan 
Rate at the 1% level. Although the negative results of M Loan Ratio are hard to explain by the 
hypothesis introduced in the previous section, by combining the positive results of Loan Rate, it can 
be assumed that domestic banks reduced the amount of their SME loans and raised their lending rate 
to make more profits and heighten their regulatory capital ratio in order to cope with regulatory 
reforms after the GFC.
As you can see from the different results among these four sub-samples, we do not get any 
determinants which can significantly and commonly explain all the four groups’ behavior in terms of 
their capital structure. Our results show that the determinants differ among banks and eras even in one 
country.
4.  Conclusions
This paper is the first empirical research on the determinants of the capital structure of Japanese 
banks. Using the unbalanced panel financial data for all the Japanese banks from 2000 to 2017, we 
estimated a fixed effects model to examine the effects of possible factors on banks’ capital ratios: the 
Ratio of capital to assets (Equity Ratio), the Regulatory capital adequacy ratio (Cap Ratio), and the 
Tier 1 Ratio.
Focusing on the different business models between the sub-samples, we analyzed whether the 
determinants of capital structure differ among sub-samples. By dividing the full sample into four 
sub-samples: “International banks before the Global Financial Crisis,” “Domestic banks before the 
GFC,” “International banks after the GFC,” and “Domestic banks after the GFC”; we compared 
their estimation results.
The results and our analysis show that the determinants differ among banks and eras even 
within one country; we find no determinants which can significantly and commonly explain all the 
four sub-samples. 
Previous researches, such as Gropp and Heider (2010) and Kinai (2018), show that the 
determinants of capital structure differ among countries or continents, or between EU countries and 
the US, and points out that these differences are probably caused by differences in business models 
due to their different cultural and historical backgrounds. This paper contributes to this literature by 
showing the differences among banks even within one country. 
We provide new evidence which shows that the determinants of banks’ capital structure vary 
and change in accordance with differences in the business models among banks. However, for a 
more detailed investigation, we need to improve our estimation models, data sets and so on. This we 
leave for future research.
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